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Abstract

This article proposes a new theoretical framework-the strategic dynamic certification model-to explain how
union certification processes operate. Statutory certification procedures are not neutral. Instead, they produce
particular incentives, disincentives, and opportunities for employers, unions, and employees, and these affect
the outcomes of the procedure. Empirical evidence confirms this model's ability to analyze the certification
process and the outcomes of unionization attempts. In particular, this model explains why the change from a
card-check to a mandatory representation vote encourages unlawful employer conduct, enhances the
effectiveness of union avoidance activities, and deters employee participation in the unionization decision.
The article concludes that, in order to accommodate a mandatory vote procedure within the existing labour
relations framework, it is necessary to counteract employer unfair labour practices during union organizing
through modifications to the certification procedure. Finally, the strategic dynamic certification model is
applied to develop specific proposals for legislative reform aimed at reducing the negative effects of the
mandatory vote procedure, thereby enhancing the validity and credibility of the certification process and of
the labour relations system.
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neutral. Instead, they produce particular incentives,
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and employees, and these affect the outcomes of the
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ability to analyze the certification process and the
outcomes of unionization attempts. In particular, this
model explains why the change from a card-check to a
mandatory representation vote encourages unlawful
employer conduct, enhances the effectiveness of union
avoidance activities, and deters employee participation
in the unionization decision. The article concludes
that, in order to accommodate a mandatory vote
procedure within the existing labour relations
framework, it is necessary to counteract employer
unfair labour practices during union organizing
through modifications to the certification procedure.
Finally, the strategic dynamic certification model is
applied to develop specific proposals for legislative
reform aimed at reducing the negative effects of the
mandatory vote procedure, thereby enhancing the
validity and credibility of the certification process and
of the labour relations system.

Cet article propose un nouveau cadre th6oriquele module d'accr6ditation dynamique strat6giquepour expliquer le fonctionnement des processus
des syndicats. Les proc6dures
d'accr6ditation
statutaires d'accr6ditation ne sont pas neutres. Plut6t,
elles produisent des motivations, d6motivations, et
occasions particuli~res en faveur des employeurs, des
syndicats et des employ6s. Celles-ci influencent les
cons6quences de la proc6dure. Les preuves empiriques
confirment la capacit6 de ce modele A analyser le
processus d'accr6ditation, ainsi que les cons6quences
des tentatives de syndicalisation. En particulier, cc
mod&le explique pourquoi le passage de la v6rification
des cartes d'adh6sion A un vote obligatoire de
repr6sentation encourage la conduite illegale des
des activit6s
l'efficacit6
employeurs, accentue
d'6vitement des syndicats et dissuade la participation
des employfs A la d6cision concernant la
pour
que,
conclut
Larticle
syndicalisation.
accommoder une proc6dure de vote obligatoire dans le
cadre existant des relations dans le monde du travail, il
est ncessaire de d6jouer les pratiques injustes des
employeurs dans le domaine du travail au cours de
lorganisation de la syndicalisation, par le biais de
modifications de la proc6dure d'accr6ditation. Enfin, le
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effets n6gatifs de la proc6dure de vote obligatoire,
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processus d'accr6ditation et le syst~me des relations
dans le monde du travail.
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I.

Strategic Dynamic Certification
INTRODUCTION

A baker making a pie knows that each ingredient reacts with the
others to produce the finished dessert. If the baker substitutes just one
ingredient without accounting for this in the rest of the recipe-such as
replacing apples with oranges--the outcome will be a very different kind
of pie. In this respect, creating a well-functioning labour relations
system is like baking a pie. Each element must be viewed in its relation
to the whole, and a change to one essential ingredient will alter the
entire system.
The Canadian labour relations system is closely modelled on the
Wagner Act, passed in 1935 by the United States Congress, which
sought to create a coherent and integrated labour relations system based
on a set of fundamental principles.' These principles are that: workers
have the right to organize unions of their choice, workers have the right
to be free of employer interference or control in organizing, and
employers are required to negotiate with unions. A card-check
certification procedure was established to effectuate these principles.2
This system was also adopted in Canada. However, in subsequent
years-and most notably over the last decade-several provinces have
altered this key element of the labour relations framework by replacing
card-check union certification procedures with a mandatory
representation vote procedure. No longer is a union able to be
recognized by the labour relations board as representative of a group of
workers by submitting union membership cards from a specified
proportion of employees. A union must now win a representation
election among employees in order to become a certified representative
of workers. In other words, our legislative bakers have substituted one

'NationalLabor RelationsAct, 29 U.S.C. § 151-169 [NLRA or WagnerAcd.
2 When the Wagner Act was first passed, trade unions gained the right to exclusively
represent a group of employees by demonstrating to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
that a sufficient proportion of these employees had signed "union authorization cards" that
indicated that the employee wished to be represented by the union. The NLRB matched signatures
on these "union authorization" cards with employer payroll records and, if a majority of employees
had signed cards, certified the union. This was called "card-check certification." It was not until the
mid-1940s that the NLRB required representation votes rather than card-check support for
certification, even though the legislation did not expressly require elections. See Richard N. Block,
John Beck & Daniel H. Kruger, Labor Law, IndustrialRelations and Employee Choice. The State
of the Workplace in the 1990s, (Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research,
1996) at 13.
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essential ingredient of the certification process (the card-check
procedure) for a new one (the mandatory vote procedure), changing the
nature' and effect of the certification process and altering the labour
relations system as a whole.
This legislative shift has tended to occur in tandem with the
election of conservative and neo-liberal, provincial governments that
view unionization as contrary to economic success. The choice of3
vote) is contentious.
certification procedure (card-check or mandatory
Unions generally prefer the card-check procedure, while employers
favour the mandatory vote procedure. Each argues that the procedure
preferred by the other is an inaccurate gauge of employees' true wishes
regarding union representation. Employers generally prefer that
certification be decided by mandatory vote in every case, arguing that it
protects employees from being pressured into signing membership cards
against their will or without understanding the effects of signing.
Employers argue that card-check makes it overly easy for unions to be
certified without real proof of desire from the workers. Also, employers
want the opportunity to address the union campaign with their
employees, arguing that a vote allows the employees to make a more
informed choice.4 Therefore, they argue, votes are more reliable proof
that their employees want a union. Unions argue that the mandatory
vote procedure will not be more accurate because it encourages
employer misconduct, and even holding the vote within short time limits
5
will not protect against these consequences.
A theoretical framework is proposed in this article--the
strategic dynamic certification model-to explain how union
certification processes operate. The model explains how differences in
incentives, disincentives, and opportunities for each of the actors in the
certification process (employers, unions, and employees) are created by
a change from the card to the vote procedure. It explains why the
' For an excellent analysis and critique of the application of the ideal of political democracy
to representation elections in the United States, see C. Becker, "Democracy in the Workplace:
Union Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law" (1993) 77 Minn. L. Rev. 495.
4
R. MacDowell, "Bill 7 Two Years Later: Some Observations on the Impact of Legislative
Change, and Some Reflections on Institutional Trends for Workplace Adjudication" (Paper
presented at an Insight Conference, Toronto, 1997) [unpublished] at 4-5.
1 E. Shilton, "Labour and Employment Law in Ontario under the PCs" (Remarks at an
Insight Conference, Toronto, 2 October 1995), reported in Lancaster's Labour Law News
(November 1995) 6.
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change from a card-check to a mandatory vote procedure encourages
unlawful employer conduct, enhances the effectiveness of union
avoidance activities, and deters employee participation in the
unionization decision. Previous research has examined the effect of a
change from card-based to mandatory vote certification. The framework
proposed in this article explains these effects. In other words, instead of
considering what has occurred as a result of the change in certification
procedures, this article is concerned with explaining why we observe
these effects.
The article concludes that in order to accommodate a
mandatory vote certification procedure within the existing labour
relations framework, modifications to the labour relations system are
necessary to remedy or offset the distortions introduced by the
mandatory vote. Alternative proposals for these changes include
different means of increasing confidentiality in voting and accelerating
elections.
The article is organized as follows. Part II briefly describes the
two alternative statutory certification procedures that currently exist in
Canada (the card-check and mandatory representation vote), providing
background for the discussion in the remainder of this article. Part III
describes two existing models used to explain unionization outcomes:
(1) the utility-maximization model and (2) the strategic choice
framework, and proposes a new model--the strategic dynamic
certification model--to explain the actions of the three actors in the
unionization process: employees, unions, and employers. In Part IV, the
new model is applied to the two existing procedures. After summarizing
the differences highlighted by the new model, four hypotheses are
generated concerning the predicted effects of a mandatory vote
procedure. In Part V the proposed model is tested-its predictions are
compared to empirical evidence of the effects of such a change in
certification procedure and are found to be consistent with this
evidence. Part VI uses these results to make recommendations for
reforms to the labour law system that will reduce the distortions
resulting from this change from a card-check to a vote-based
certification procedure. Finally, Part VII offers some concluding
comments.
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CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES

Union certification is the process by which a labour relations
board grants a trade union the exclusive right to represent a specified
group of employees (the "bargaining unit") for the purposes of
negotiating and administering a collective agreement with the employer.
This Part provides a brief introduction to the requirements for
certification and the two alternative statutory certification procedures in
Canada.
Although the particulars vary among jurisdictions, applicant
unions must satisfy four basic requirements in order to obtain
certification: (1) qualification (the applicant must be a trade union
within the meaning of the relevant labour legislation), (2)
appropriateness (the bargaining unit applied for must be appropriate for
collective bargaining), (3) timeliness, and (4) evidence of sufficient
support for certification among the employees. This fourth criterion,
adequacy of support, is determined by one of two alternative
procedures: the card-check procedure or the mandatory representation
vote procedure.
The card-check procedure was one of the elements of the
Wagner model of labour relations adopted in Canada. It has come to be
widely identified with labour relations in this country, such that this
process for testing support for union representation has been referred to
as the "Canadian system."6 All Canadian jurisdictions employed the
card-check certification procedure until, in the 1970s and 1980s, Nova
Scotia, Alberta, and for a time British Columbia, adopted mandatory
representation votes.7 Since the mid-1990s, the shift towards requiring
representation elections to establish certification rights has become
more pronounced as three of the largest provinces, Ontario in 1995,
British Columbia in 2001, and Manitoba in 1997, as well as
Newfoundland and Labrador in 1994, have replaced their card-check
procedures with mandatory vote requirements.' More recently,
6 Paul Weiler, "Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under
the NLRA" (1983) 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1769 at 1805.
7
A mandatory representation vote system has been in place in Nova Scotia since May 1977,
Alberta since November 1988, and in British Columbia between June 1984 and December 1992.
' The Ontario Labour Relations Act, 1995, being Schedule A to the Labour Relations and

Employment Statute Law Amendment Act, S.O. 1995, c. 1 (OLRA) (in force 10 November 1995)
replaced card-check certification with mandatory representation votes. The British Columbia Sk'lls
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Manitoba has reverted to card-check certification, and Ontario recently
began allowing unions applying for certification in the construction
industry to elect to proceed under a card-based procedure.9 As a result,
almost as many jurisdictions in this country now require a
representation election as those that will grant certification based solely
on cards.'
A.

Card-CheckCertificationProcedure

Under a card-check procedure, the applicant union submits an
application for certification to the labour relations board, including a
description of the bargaining unit the applicant seeks to represent. If the
union is able to demonstrate that it has signed cards from a specified
percentage of the employees in the bargaining unit (usually at least 55
per cent), then it is generally entitled to "automatic certification" as the
sole bargaining agent of the employees in that unit, provided the other
statutory requirements for certification are met."

Development and Labour Statutes Amendment Act, 2001, S.B.C. 2001 c. 33 ss. 3, 4 (in force 16
August 2001) (B.C. Reg. 206/2001) reintroduced mandatory representation elections. A
representation vote procedure, requiring that a vote be held unless the union and employer agree
otherwise, was introduced in Newfoundland and Labrador in February 1994 with the Labour
RelationsAct, R.S.N. 1990, c. L-1, s. 47(1), (2) as am. by S.N. 1993, c. 58, s. 1.
' The LabourRelations Amendment Act (2), 1st Sess., 37th Leg., Manitoba (assented to 18
August 2000), S.M. 2000, c. 45; Section 8 of the Labour Relations Statute Law Amendment Act,
2005,S.O. 2005, c. 15, amending OLRA [Bill 144].
" A card-check procedure is currently employed in the Federal jurisdiction under the
CanadaLabour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2, s. 28, and under Saskatchewan's Trade Union Act, R.S.S.
1978, c. T-17, s. 6, Manitoba's Labour Relations Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. L-10, s. 40, Quebec's Labour
Code, R.S.Q., c. C-27, s. 28, New Brunswick's IndustrialRelations Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. 1-4, s. 14,
and Prince Edward Island's LabourAct,R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. L-1, s. 13(5).
A mandatory representation vote procedure is presently in place under British Columbia's
LabourRelations Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 244, s. 24, Alberta's LabourRelations Code, R.S.A. 2000,
c. L-1, s. 34, Ontario's Labour Relations Act, 1995, supra note 8, s. 8, Nova Scotia's Trade Union
Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 475, s. 25 and Newfoundland's Labour RelationsAct, supra note 8, s. 38.
" If the trade union does not succeed in showing the requisite support for automatic
certification, but does demonstrate that it has obtained signed cards from a specified, lesser
proportion of unit employees (usually 40 to 55 per cent), then it is entitled to a representation vote.
Where the applicant receives a majority of the votes cast in a representation election, the labour
board will grant the certification, if the other statutory requirements for certification are satisfied.
Very few representation elections are held under the card-check certification procedures and most
certifications are obtained on the basis of authorization cards. For instance, between January 1993
and November 1995 in Ontario, fewer than 10 per cent of certification application cases required an
election. Sara Slinn, The Union CertificationExperience in Ontario. 1993 to 1998 (Ph.D. Thesis,
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Hearings to deal with any objections to the application raised by
the employer will be held before the board decides whether or not to
issue a certification, and may substantially delay the holding of an
election.2
B.

MandatoryRepresentation Vote Procedure

Under a mandatory representation vote certification procedure,
the applicant union must win a representation election in order to
obtain certification. Although union membership cards are also
collected and submitted under this procedure, their use is limited to
determining whether or not there is sufficient employee support for a
representation election to be held--certification is not available on the
basis of card support alone. Although the process differs somewhat
among jurisdictions, the essential elements are similar. First, the
applicant union submits a certification application to the board for a
particular bargaining unit. The employer is promptly notified of the
application by the labour board or applicant, and may file a reply to the
application. The union will be entitled to a representation vote if its
application is accompanied by signed union membership cards from a
legislatively determined minimum percentage of employees in the
proposed bargaining unit (generally 40 per cent). The legislation directs
the time frame for the vote to be held, generally within five or ten days
of the date the application is received by the labour board, depending
on the jurisdiction. 13 Unlike elections held under the card-check

University of Toronto, 2003) [unpublished] at 162 [Slinn, "Certification Experience"]. Applications
with support from less than 40 per cent of employees in the unit are dismissed.
12Ontario, between 1993 and 1995, provided an alternative procedure to permit elections
to be held expeditiously to prevent employers from seeking to delay the vote in order to weaken
support for unionization: the pre-hearing representation election. Unions obtaining cards from at
least 35 per cent of employees in the proposed unit could apply for a pre-hearing representation
election. The Board had the discretion to order that the vote be held prior to any certification
hearings. However, this procedure was seldom used: only 2.7 per cent of all non-construction, nonraid certification applications (ninety-six cases) were decided under this procedure. Ibid.at 135.
'3 In contrast, the NLRA provides no time limit for elections to be held; in the United States
the median time between certification application and vote is fifty days. United States Commission
on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, Fact Finding Report, 1994) at 82. In contrast
with this, certification votes in Canada have come to be referred to as "quick votes." Alberta simply
requires that the vote occur "as soon as possible." LabourRelations Code, supra note 10, s. 34(3).
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procedure, mandatory elections are not delayed by certification
hearings, which are routinely held after the vote has occurred.
If a majority of the ballots cast in the vote are in favour of the
union, it will be entitled to be certified as the exclusive representative
for that bargaining unit, provided
that the other legal requirements for
14
certification are satisfied.
C.

Stages of the CertificationProcess

Under either procedure, the certification process consists of six
stages, including three key events (initiating organizing, filing the
application for certification, and the election if one is required), and
three key periods (the organizing period, the post-application period,
and the post-election period, if an election occurs). These stages are set
out in the order that they occur in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Stages of the Certification Process

Organizing
Initiated

Certification
Application Filed

Organizing
Period

III.

Post-Application
Period

Election

Post-Election
Period

THEORETICAL MODELS EXPLAINING UNIONIZATION
DECISIONS

A number of theoretical models have been developed seeking to
explain unionization decisions and outcomes. Primary among them are
the utility-maximization model and the strategic choice model, which I

14 Note that British Columbia's Labour Relations Code, supra note 10, s. 24.3 and
Newfoundland's Labour Relations Act, supra note 8, s. 38(2), require that a minimum proportion
of eligible voters cast ballots in order for a representation election to be valid.
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explain below.' 5 In this Part, I propose an alternative model of the union
certification process: the strategic dynamic certification model. This
model draws elements from both the utility-maximization model and the
strategic choice framework, and includes several unique elements. It
approaches the certification application outcome as the result of
decision making by employees, the union, and the employer; it regards
this decision making as being both utility-maximizing and strategic; and
it recognizes that actors have multiple opportunities for decision making
during the certification process. The strategic dynamic certification
model is offered as a more comprehensive explanation of certification
activity, and one that applies to both card-check and mandatory
representation vote procedures.
A.

Utility-MaximizationModel

Theorists in economics and industrial relations have long
regarded the unionization decision as a utility-maximization decision
made by the individual worker. 6 Under the utility-maximization model
of union certification, and in the context of a certification application, a
worker's decision about unionization is based on that individual's
subjective evaluation of the expected costs and benefits of unionization
to him or her."7 Although early expressions of this approach focused
only on employee decision making, this model was later extended to
include the subjective weighing of costs and benefits by all three actors8
affected by union certification: employees, unions, and management.'
Thomason further refined the utility-maximization model by suggesting
that the unionization decision could be viewed as a collective, utility9
maximizing decision made by the proposed bargaining unit as a whole.
'Orley Ashenfelter & John Pencavel, "American Trade Union Growth: 1900-1960" (1969)
83 Q. J. Econ. 434; John J. Lawler, Unionization and Deunionization Strategy, Tactics, and
Outcomes (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1990).
16 Utility maximization refers to the goal of obtaining the greatest utility from consumption
of goods and services which, in the unionization context, refers to the worker's goal of maximizing
his or her benefits from employment which may include the benefits provided by union
representation.
17 Ashenfelter & Pencavel, supra note 15 at 436; B. E. Becker & R. U. Miller, "Patterns
and Determinants of Union Growth in the Hospital Industry" (1981) 2 J. Lab. Res. 309 at 311.
'See e.g. Becker & Miller, ibid.
19 Terry Thomason, "The Effect of Accelerated Certification Procedures on Union
Organizing Success in Ontario" (1994) 47 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 207 at 214.
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This perspective contrasts with the traditional view that unionization is
the product of numerous, separate, utility-maximizing decisions made by
individual employees.
B.

Strategic Choice Model

Lawler's strategic choice model addresses what he perceives as
key weaknesses of other approaches: that they either exclude or
improperly downplay the role of strategy in the certification process and
in the unionization decision, and that they primarily attribute
unionization outcomes to exogenous contextual forces rather than to the
actors' strategic choices.2" In contrast, the strategic choice model focuses
on the interlinked and interdependent strategic choices and
discretionary actions of two actors (employers and unions) to explain
unionization outcomes.2 This model also recognizes the role of power
in organizing campaigns and that the balance of power between unions
and employers is influenced by how each actor responds to the
constraints and possibilities it faces. Strategy, in this model, refers to
actors' attempts to gain power, with the main objective being control of
the employees in the proposed unit.2 Lawler identifies actors' strategic
responses as either adaptive, whereby actors operate within the
limitations of the established context, or proactive, in which an actor
seeks to change the context within which the unionization attempt is
occurring to increase that actor's own power. The role of employees is
limited to being a contextual factor, with the strategic choices of the
union and employer affecting employees' tendency to unionize.23
C.

StrategicDynamic CertificationModel

The strategic dynamic certification model provides an
alternative approach to explaining unionization decisions. While it is
based on the utility-maximization model and the strategic choice
framework, it includes several novel elements capturing important
20

Lawler, supra note 15 at 11-12. Exogenous contextual factors include such influences as
market factors, political influences, social support for unionization, technology, demographic
characteristics of employees, and union and employer structures (ibid.at 20-21).
21

22

Ibid.

Ibid.at 20.

23Ibid.

at 21.
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aspects of decision making. The strategic dynamic certification model
has three dimensions: the actor, the stage of the certification process,
and the certification procedure (card-check or vote). This model is
represented diagrammatically in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Actors' Decision Points in the Strategic Dynamic Certification
Model
Organizing
Initiated
Actor
Employee
Union
Employer
Note:

Card

Vote

Stage of Certification Procedure
PostElection
PostFiling
Election
Application
Application
Period
Period
Vote Card Vote Card Vote Card Vote Card Vote
n/a
n/a
€"
n/a
n/a
,€
*7
n/a
W,

Organizing
Period
Card

,*

V Indicates opportunity for decision making.
* Indicates this opportunity exists if the employer is aware of the organizing attempt at
that time.

This model builds on earlier approaches by incorporating three
actors: employees (both individually and collectively), the union, and the
employer, recognizing that all are active participants in efforts at
certification. It does not view the unionization decision as a one-time
choice made by each actor, which is an implicit premise of much of the
existing certification literature and of the utility-maximization theory.
Nor does this model regard actors' decision making as a continuous
process, as the strategic choice framework suggests. Instead,
certification application outcomes are seen as the result of a series of
discrete decisions made by employees, by unions, and by employers.
In the course of the unionization process each actor has at least
one, and often several, distinct opportunities to decide how to act or
react to the possibility of unionization. Opportunities for decision
making occur at each stage in the certification process: at the outset of
organizing, during the period the union is attempting to organize a unit
of employees, at the time for submission of the certification application
with the labour relations board, and in the period following submission
of the certification application. In circumstances where a representation
election is required, two additional opportunities for decision making
exist: the election itself, and the period following the election but before
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the board has disposed of the application.24 The strategic dynamic
model focuses on these decision points.
It is important to note that each actor does not necessarily have
an opportunity for decision making at each stage of the process under
either certification procedure, and the effectiveness of an actor's action
at each point is also dependent on the decisions and conduct of other
actors and on the procedural context. Figure 2, above, identifies the
decision points available to each actor at each stage of the process, for
both the card-check procedure and for the mandatory vote procedure.
Opportunities for decision making differ between the two certification
procedures for each actor, both with respect to the number of
opportunities for decision making and the timing of these opportunities.
Under this model, decision making has two aspects: it can be
both utility maximizing and strategic. Decision making is utility
maximizing in the sense that the actors seek to obtain the greatest utility
in the existing circumstances. Decisions and actions may also be
strategic where actors seek to change the context and constraints within
which they operate, in order to shift the balance of power among the
actors in their favour.
Unlike earlier models, the strategic dynamic model is designed
to apply to both card-check and mandatory vote procedures, and is
capable of accounting for the different utility-maximizing calculations
that actors undertake under both procedures. As in Lawler's strategic
choice framework, this model appreciates the importance of the balance
of power during organizing attempts, and allows for shifts in the relative
power (in terms of ability to influence the outcome of a certification
attempt) of different actors over the course of the certification process
and between the two certification procedures.
Finally, this model explicitly recognizes that changes to
certification procedures may influence parties' decision making. It
proposes that the relative importance of the decision making by the
three actors, the opportunities for decision making, and the contextual
factors influencing these decisions, are influenced by which certification
procedure is in place. In particular, the number of decision points each
actor faces and the potential effect on the outcome of actors' decisions
differs between the card-check and vote procedures.

4The stages of the certification process are set out in Figure 1, above.
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As a result, this model focuses on the interconnection between
process and procedure as determined by the legislation and actors'
utility-maximizing and strategic decisions, offering insights into why the
choice of certification procedure produces changes in the certification
experience and outcome.
IV.

OF
THE
APPLICATION
CERTIFICATION MODEL

STRATEGIC

DYNAMIC

In this Part, I apply the strategic dynamic model from the
perspective of each of the three actors in the unionization process
(employees, the union, and the employer), identifying the opportunities
for decision making first under the card procedure, then under the
mandatory vote procedure. For each decision point, I explain the utilitymaximizing and strategic decision making that the model predicts will
occur at each stagey2
Applying the model illuminates several aspects of the
certification procedure and of the consequences of the choice of
legislative procedure governing this process. It is evident that the
differences resulting from the choice of procedure are of several kinds.
First, the two alternative procedures introduce differences in the
opportunities for each actor to take action or express their views on
unionization. Such opportunities occur at different stages, and a greater
or lesser number of opportunities arise under the two procedures.
Second, the incentives and disincentives for supporting or opposing
unionization also differ significantly between the two regimes. Further,
the effectiveness of parties' actions differs depending on whether cardcheck certification is available or whether a representation election is
required. Finally, application of the strategic dynamic model also reveals
that the overall balance of power among the actors is different under
different certification procedures.
In particular, the model illustrates four propositions:
1.

The costs to employees and to unions of supporting
unionization are greater under the vote procedure than
under the card procedure, while the benefits to

As noted, these three dimensions of the model, including decision points, are set out in
Figure 2, above.
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2.

unionization remain virtually the same. Therefore,
employees and unions have less incentive to seek
certification under mandatory votes.
Under the mandatory vote procedure employers .have
more opportunities and greater incentives to engage in
union avoidance, including unfair labour practices
(ULPS). 26

3.

4.

A.

Union avoidance tactics, including ULPs, are more
effective under the mandatory vote procedure than
under card-check certification.
With the introduction of a mandatory vote certification
procedure, the balance of power shifts in favour of
employers.

Employee DecisionMaking

The strategic dynamic certification model predicts that
employees will decide to support unionization if their perception of the
benefits of supporting certification is not outweighed by the expected
costs of doing so. The potential costs and benefits to workers of
unionization are recognized to be both economic and psychological.27
Economic benefits include an expectation of increased wages and
benefits, employment security, and improved conditions of work, while
economic costs include payment of union dues, and the risk of losing
income from strikes and lockouts. 28 Psychological benefits include
working under more equitable employer practices, such as greater
equity and less arbitrariness in workplace rules and administration, and
standardized wage structures. A key benefit to workers from unionizing
is access to collective bargaining and a collective agreement as tools for
altering the work rules governing their work lives.29 Non-economic costs

26 For the purposes of this article ULPs are defined as unlawful employer union-avoidance

tactics.
2
Becker & Miller, supranote 17 at 311; C. Scott, A. Seers & R. Culpepper, "Determinants
of Union Election Outcomes in the Non-Hospital Health Care Industry" (1996) 17 J. Lab. Res. 701
at 705.
28 Ashenfelter & Pencavel, supra note 15 at 436; Becker & Miller, supra note 17 at 311;

Scott, Seers & Culpepper, ibid.
' William Cooke, "Determinants of the Outcomes of Union Certification Elections"
(1983) 36 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 402 at 403.
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include the risk of employer retaliation against employees, the
psychological costs of violating professional or community norms, and
inconvenience of union membership.3"
If anticipated benefits are greater than, or at least equal to, the
expected costs of supporting unionization as subjectively perceived by
the employee, the model predicts that the employee will support
certification. According to the model, the worker will be expected to
sign a union membership card, participate in an election, and vote for
the union. Conversely, if costs exceed benefits then the model predicts
that the employee will not support unionization and will not sign a
membership card or, having done so, the employee may opt to either
not cast a ballot or vote against certification if an election is held.
Even though employees are the object of any unionization
attempt, and are the ones who will either obtain or reject union
representation, employees have the most limited strategic role of the
three actors. Employees may act strategically by inviting a union to
organize the workplace or by choosing to respond to a union's overtures
and actively supporting a unionization effort. These actions are
described as "strategic" because, although they may not appear rational
based on a cost-benefit calculation by the employee (for instance,
knowingly risking employer retaliation by choosing to be prominent in
the organizing campaign), they may be directed at the longer-term goal
of altering the balance of power in the workplace in employees' favour.
Card-Check Procedure

1.

Under the card-check procedure, employees generally have two
distinct opportunities to make cost-benefit calculations and to express
their preference for or against unionization.
The first opportunity occurs during the first stage of the
certification process, when one or more employees invite a union to
organize their workplace, or when employees are approached by a union
organizer. Employees have a second opportunity to make and express a
decision about unionization, during the organizing period, when
employees may choose to sign a union membership card or

3

Becker & Miller, supra note 17; Ashenfelter & Pencavel, supra note 15 at 436.
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application.31 Therefore, in most cases under the card-check procedure
workers have, at most, two opportunities to indicate whether or not they
want to be represented by a union.
At both of these points the benefits of supporting union
organizing are as described above, but there are additional costs for
employees to assess. Employees thinking about seeking a union to
represent them, or deciding how to respond to a union's organizing
advances, will worry that their employer might learn of the union activity
and may punish employees it suspects of being involved. Employees may
also be concerned about being pressured by union organizers or coworkers about whether or not to sign a union membership card.
2.

Mandatory Vote Procedure

Under the mandatory vote procedure, employees have four
distinct opportunities to express their wishes about unionization. Unlike
under the card-check procedure, employees have additional
opportunities for making and expressing their preferences in the postapplication period and in a representation election. As under the cardcheck procedure, employees may first decide whether to solicit union
representation or to receive or reject an approach by union organizers,
and then, if organizing proceeds, they may choose to support
certification by signing a union membership card. During the postapplication period, employees have another opportunity to decide
whether or not they wish to be unionized, and then may express their
choice in the representation election.
These additional decision points are accompanied by additional
costs for employees to take into account, including a greater risk of
employer retaliation and the inconvenience and effort involved in
voting. During the post-application period the employer knows of the
union threat (having been notified of the application by the labour
relations board) and the employer has a period of several days before
the election during which it may try to foil the certification attempt. The
risk of retaliation by an employer against employees it thinks are
supporting the union is greater in these circumstances than under the

31 As noted above, the majority of certification applications under the card-check
procedure are determined on the basis of the level of membership evidence in the form of cards
submitted with the union's certification application.
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card procedure, where the employer has less opportunity to try to thwart
organizing. Employees must also consider the potential costs of
participating in the election. While it is a "secret ballot" in the sense
that the employee's vote is not disclosed, the election generally takes
place in the workplace and the employer and its scrutineers see which
employees cast ballots and which do not. Employees may reasonably
worry that their employer may draw conclusions about their loyalty to
the employer or support for the union from whether they vote or not,
and from the number of votes cast each way in the election. Finally, by
requiring employees to confirm their preference for certification by
voting for the union in an election, the mandatory vote procedure
imposes greater inconvenience and costs on workers.
In sum, this model shows that, relative to the card-check
procedure, the costs to employees of supporting organizing are likely to
be greater under the mandatory vote procedure, while the benefits of
doing so are no different. Consequently, this model predicts that there
will be lower employee support for union organizing under the vote
procedure compared to the card-check procedure. Further, it is likely
that this decline in support will be greatest in those workplaces,
industries, and sectors where employer retaliation is expected to be
more aggressive (such as small workplaces and the private sector), and
among more vulnerable employees (such as part-time workers).

B.

Union Decision Making

This model predicts that a union will seek to organize a new unit
if the expected benefits to the union outweigh the anticipated costs of
doing so. The main benefit to a union of organizing a new unit is
revenue from new membership dues,32 although this may be offset by
the costs of obtaining the certification and servicing these new members.
Unions may also obtain non-economic benefits from organizing an

2Becker & Miller, supra note 17.
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otherwise costly unit if, for instance, doing so contributes to the union's
broader organizing strategy.3 3
The union is the key strategic actor in the organizing context. It
is the union that decides whether to attempt to organize, and decides
whether to file a certification application. The union also makes reactive
strategic choices, such as deciding whether to respond to employer
challenges to the application. These strategic actions are primarily
aimed at affecting the balance of power in the workplace in favour of
the union and employees in the unit.
1.

Card-Check Procedure

Under the card-check procedure, the board grants or denies
most certification applications based on whether or not the union has
submitted a sufficient number of union membership cards.
Consequently, a union's key decision making occurs during the first
three stages of the certification procedure as it decides whether to
initiate organizing, whether to continue organizing, and whether to file a
certification application.
At the first stage in the process, the union weighs the potential
costs and benefits of certifying the particular group of employees to
decide whether to seek enough cards to apply for certification. The
union makes this calculation in light of the likelihood of certification
success, and will continue to reassess the value of continuing the
certification campaign throughout the second (organizing) stage.
During this stage, the employer may try to derail the
certification attempt if it learns of the union's activity. The union must
then decide whether and how to respond to the employer's actions.
Filing and pursuing ULP complaints against the employer is expensive
and time consuming. Furthermore, if the employer's tactics have
dissuaded employees from supporting the union, it may need to increase
its organizing efforts to counter this effect on employee support. Any of
these responses increases the union's organizing costs and the union
may re-evaluate whether to continue the organizing drive. If employer

-- These strategies include organizing several units of a particular employer's employees
(for instance, a union may try to organize clerks at each store in a chain), or organizing all workers
in a particular occupation in a geographic area in several units (such as all casino workers in a
particular city). See Scott, Seers & Culpepper, supra note 27 at 705.
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interference occurs before the union has filed a certification application,
then the union may choose to abandon the organizing drive and not
apply for certification. The union may even choose not to file a ULP
complaint against the employer. The union may well decide to terminate
the organizing at this point, particularly if the misconduct was so
egregious as to make it virtually impossible, in the mind of the union, to
regain sufficient employee support for the union to create a viable
bargaining unit.
If the union opts to continue organizing, it may still decide not
to file a complaint. Complaints may delay the board's certification
application decision if the board chooses not to issue a certification
decision until ULP allegations are determined. Where a hearing into the
complaint is necessary, the delay may be lengthy. Such delays, in
themselves, can wear down support for the union.
At the stage of deciding whether to file a certification
application, the union weighs its chances of success and the benefits of
certification against the costs of preparing and filing the application and
its estimate of the costs it will incur in the post-application stage.
Potential costs to a union in the post-application stage include the costs
of responding to any legal challenges to the certification application
raised by the employer3 4 and pursuing any ULP complaints. Although
employer anti-union tactics at this stage will not directly affect the
outcome of the certification application (assuming no election is
required), even a successful certification may be defeated if the
employer's conduct causes employees to withdraw their support for the
union. In these circumstances, the longer-term viability of the unit is
jeopardized and the unit is more likely to fail to reach a first collective
agreement or to decertify. This may discourage the union, and even at
the post-application stage, the union may decide to seek to withdraw or
adjourn the application, rather than pursue certification.
2.

Mandatory Vote Procedure

Union decision making at the initial and organizing stages is
similar under the card-check and mandatory vote procedures. It is at the
filing stage that union decision making under the two procedures

4 In some of these cases, the employer may challenge the validity of the cards or such
matters as the scope or appropriateness of the unit.
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diverges. Where a representation election is required, crucial union
decision making occurs not only at the pre-application stages (deciding
whether to organize and, if necessary, how to respond to employer antiunion tactics), but also at the application, post-application, and postelection stages.
While unions' pre-application costs are similar between the two
certification procedures, they face greater post-application costs under
the vote procedure than under the card procedure. However, the
benefits of organizing are unchanged. These higher costs under the
mandatory vote procedure arise from the increased opportunities and
incentives for the employer to engage in union avoidance activities
during the post-application stage, the necessity of maintaining employee
support until the election, and ensuring that employees confirm their
support in the election. In addition, the union has more decision points
under the vote procedure: whether to respond to an employer campaign
in the period between application and election; whether to pursue a
vote, withdraw, or adjourn the application; and whether to continue with
organizing or withdraw.
When deciding whether to apply, and again at the postapplication stage, unions trying to certify under the mandatory vote
procedure must consider election costs, including the cost of
maintaining employees' support for the union between the time an
35
employee signs a membership card and the time the ballots are cast.
The election cannot, as a practical matter, be held the day the
application is filed. Although there may be legislative time limits within
which the vote must be held, this gives the employer several days to
formulate and execute a strategy to avoid certification by dissuading
employees from voting for the union. Maintaining employee support
until the election can be costly even in the absence of employer
resistance, particularly if the union decides to counter employer
attempts to defeat the certification attempt.
Should the employer try to discourage employees from
certifying, the union must decide whether and how to respond-as it
would have to do if the employer engaged in union avoidance activities

'5 Under this procedure, sufficiency of employee support for certification is measured by
the results of the representation vote, not by the cards submitted with the application. Membership
cards are only relevant for determining whether the union has met the threshold of support
necessary for a representation vote to be held.
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at the organizing stage. Pursuing a ULP complaint may be expensive and
time consuming, and complaints (particularly in the mandatory vote
context) are often not resolved or even heard by the labour board until
after the election has been held or the certification decision has been
issued. Therefore, the effect of an employer's unlawful anti-union
conduct will almost certainly not be offset by a declaration of
wrongdoing or remedy issued by the board prior to the vote. This is
exacerbated in jurisdictions such as Ontario where the board has been
relieved of the power to make remedial certification orders or to order
interim reinstatement of employees. ULP complaints may also delay the
board's certification decision, which may weaken the unit in the longer
term. Unions also consider whether it is worthwhile to continue the
organizing effort, or whether the employer's conduct (legal or not) has
eroded employee support for unionization so that either the application
is likely to fail or, even if certification is granted, the unit has been
irreparably weakened. In these cases the bargaining unit may not be
viable, may fail to reach a first collective agreement, and may be quickly
decertified. Further, if the employer raises legal challenges to the
application or the voting list, the union will also have to consider the
cost, and possibly lengthy delay involved in responding to these
challenges. At this point, the union may conclude that it will not
continue to pursue the application, and seek to withdraw or adjourn the
application.
At the election stage, the union does not have an opportunity for
decision making; the employees are the only decision makers. Postelection, and before the board has issued a decision, the union has the
opportunity to decide, again, whether to continue to pursue the
certification. The union will consider factors such as responding to any
employer union avoidance tactics, and responding to employer
objections to the application, voting list, or conduct of the election.
Until the board issues its decision on the matter, the union may still seek
to withdraw or adjourn the application.
In sum, this model predicts that, with a change from a cardcheck to a mandatory vote certification procedure, organizing activity
will decline. Unions will be more cautious about initiating organizing
activity because the vote procedure makes this a more costly, lengthy,
and risky process, with a greater probability of anti-union activities by
employers, leading to a lower chance of certification for the unit applied
for. At the same time, the benefits to unions of organizing are
unchanged. In particular, this model anticipates that, under the
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mandatory vote, there will be fewer organizing efforts by unions and
therefore fewer certification applications will be filed. A greater
proportion of applications, and therefore of certifications granted, will
be for units with characteristics making them relatively easy to unionize.
That is, unions will tend to focus on what they perceive to be relatively
less costly and less risky organizing targets, such as larger units, units in
industries where support for unionization is likely to be higher (such as
the manufacturing industry, a traditional source of union strength), and
the public sector units (where less employer resistance to unions is
expected). There will be a shift away from part-time units toward less
vulnerable workers with greater commitment to the workplace. For
these same reasons, it is predicted that unions will be more likely to
discontinue organizing drives or apply to withdraw certification
applications.
Employer DecisionMaking

C.

Like the union, the employer is a key strategic actor in the
unionization context. However, in contrast with the union, the
employer's strategic actions are largely reactive, although there is scope
for proactive strategic union avoidance--especially before the
employer's workers are targeted for an organizing attempt.
Generally, employers expect unionization to increase their costs,
6
primarily due to higher labour costs, reduced profits,3 greater costs for
managing the workplace because of the necessity for bargaining and
administering a collective agreement, and the costs of any union
avoidance activities the employer chooses to engage in. Employers also
recognize several sources of non-economic costs from unionization, such
as the reduction in unilateral employer discretion and power in the
workplace.
As Becker and Miller note, employers generally have difficulty
identifying any benefits from unionization-at least until they have
experience with a union-and these authors suggest employers' real
calculus is a comparison of the costs of resisting unionization with the

36

See Richard B. Freeman & James L. Medoff, What Do Unions Do? (New York: Basic
Books, Inc., 1984) at 163 for a discussion of research concluding that workplaces with a union in
place tend to have greater productivity, but lower profits; Scott, Seers & Culpepper, supra note 27
at 705.
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expected costs if the union succeeds in being certified. 37 Therefore,
employers' strategic decision making relates to deciding whether or not
to resist unionization. Nevertheless, there are potential benefits to
employers from unionization, such as increased productivity, greater
3
employee satisfaction, and reduced conflict in the workplace. 1
Consequently, this model predicts that an employer will try to
avoid unionization if it perceives the costs of unionization exceed either
the benefits, or if it estimates that the costs of unionization are greater
than the costs of union avoidance. Employer resistance ranges from
legal challenges to the certification application to committing ULPs, such
as intimidating or threatening employees, to discourage them from
supporting certification.
1.

Card-Check Procedure

Under the card procedure the employer will often not be aware
of an organizing effort until notified by the labour relations board that a
certification application has been filed for a group of the employer's
workers. As a result, an employer generally does not have an
opportunity to decide whether or how to react to union organizing until
the post-application period. It may then choose to engage in unionavoidance activity ranging from legitimate challenges to the union's
application to illegal ULPS.
Many applications under the card-check procedure are
determined on the basis of membership evidence submitted with the
application. In these cases, post-application employer responses (other
than legal challenges to the application) will likely have no effect on the
outcome of the certification application.3 9 Therefore, in general,
employer responses may be expected to be less effective at influencing
employee certification decisions in the context of card-check
certification than under the vote procedure.

"7Becker & Miller, supra note 17 at 311.
Freeman & Medoff, supra note 36 at c. 11.
I These employer activities may negatively affect the longer-term viability of the certified
unit. Research on this effect is discussed below at note 52.
-'
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Mandatory Vote Procedure

Under the mandatory vote procedure, employer decision making
occurs at both the pre-application (organizing) stage (if the employer
becomes aware of the organizing drive before a certification application
is filed) and the post-application period. However, the potential
effectiveness of employer responses is likely to be greater than under
the card-check procedure. Under the mandatory vote procedure, even if
the employer first learns of an organizing drive after the application has
been filed, the employer has a statutorily determined period of time
(five working days in Ontario) before the vote is held. During this postapplication period the employer can engage in a union avoidance
campaign to influence employees' voting decisions. As a result, under
the vote procedure, the effectiveness, and therefore the likely benefits,
of employer resistance may be expected to be greater than under the
card procedure.
The strategic dynamic certification model therefore predicts that
the introduction of mandatory representation elections for certification
will encourage employers to engage in union avoidance efforts, which
may include ULPS. 4 This change in the certification process does not
alter the benefits or costs of unionization to the employer, or the costs
of engaging in anti-union conduct. However, it does increase the
benefits of, and opportunities for, employer resistance to unionization.
The vote procedure gives employers a greater opportunity, in every case
where an application is filed, to engage in union avoidance activities,
and these opportunities can be exercised before the election is held. At
this stage, employer actions can readily affect the outcome of the
certification by influencing employees' voting behaviour. As a result, it is
likely that these tactics will be more effective compared to resistance
under the card procedure where, by the time the employer learns of the
organizing, it may be too late to affect the outcome.
This model demonstrates that there is both greater opportunity
and greater incentives for employer interference or influence on
40 It is important to note that an increase in union avoidance activities will not necessarily
be reflected in an increase in ULP complaints. It may be that because union avoidance tactics are
expected to be more effective under the vote system, it is more likely that in these circumstances
unions will conclude that it is not worthwhile to file a complaint, instead abandoning that
organizing attempt. Therefore, no prediction is made about whether uLP complaints-as distinct
from union avoidance and ULP activity itself-will change with a change in certification procedure.
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employee decision making under the vote procedure than under the
card procedure. Consequently, this model predicts that employers will
be more likely to engage in union avoidance activities, including ULPs,
under the mandatory vote procedure. As a result this model anticipates
that union organizing efforts will be less likely to succeed under the
mandatory vote, compared to the card procedure, and that these effects
will be most pronounced in more vulnerable groups of workers, such as
small units, those composed of part-time workers, and those in the
private sector.
D.

Shift in Balance of Power

Finally, application of the strategic dynamic model also reveals
that the overall balance of power among the actors is affected by the
certification procedure in place. With a change to a mandatory vote
procedure the balance of power shifts in favour of employers. Under the
vote procedure, employers are given more opportunities for a role in
employees' decision making about union representation, and greater
influence over the certification application outcome.
Under the card procedure the union is generally the most
influential strategic decision maker. The union's decision whether or not
to file the application is of greatest importance, since most applications
under that procedure are determined on the basis of card support filed
with the application. Once employees have signed cards, they lack an
opportunity to influence the outcome, except in those few cases where
card support is so low that an election is held. Employers are generally
not aware of the organizing until after the application, so employers
have relatively little opportunity to influence employees' or unions'
certification decision making.
In contrast, with a mandatory vote, employer decisions about
whether and how to respond in the post-application period and
employees' decisions about whether and how to vote, can significantly
affect the certification outcome. Employers' actions can influence both
employee voting decisions and unions' decisions about whether to
pursue the application through the election stage.
Therefore, in the post-application stage under the vote
procedure, employer actions have a greater effect on the outcome
compared to employee or employer responses at this stage under the
card procedure. This reflects an overall shift in the balance of power
towards employers.

Strategic Dynamic Certification
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Hypotheses

In sum, the strategic dynamic model of certification leads to the
following hypotheses about the effects of introduction of a mandatory
representation election procedure:
1.
2.

3.

4.

V.

Fewer certification applications will be filed.
Unions will tend to favour organizing units with a
relatively higher chance of success and will be less likely
to seek to unionize units which are relatively difficult to
certify, such as part-time, private sector, and small
bargaining units. This preference will also be reflected in
a change in the characteristics of units that obtain
certification.
Employers' union avoidance efforts will increase,
although this may not be reflected in higher levels of ULP
complaints.
In part because of increased employer resistance efforts,
the probability of certification application success will be
reduced.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECTS OF CHANGE
IN CERTIFICATION PROCEDURE

Several quantitative empirical studies have examined the effects
of replacing card-check certification with a mandatory representation
vote procedure. These studies conclude that this type of legislative
change is associated with fewer certification applications being made, a
reduction in successful certification applications, changes in the types of
applicants and successful units, and an increase in the number of
complaints of employer ULPS. Such research provides quantitative,
empirical evidence that a discrete change to the labour legislation
framework, such as a change to the certification procedure, has
observable and measurable ancillary effects on the broader labour
relations system. The results of these studies are summarized and tested
against the hypotheses drawn from the strategic dynamic model. The
predictions of this model are found to be highly consistent with the
empirical evidence, suggesting that the strategic dynamic model is a
useful instrument for explaining union certification.
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FewerApplicationsfor Certification

Consistent with the hypotheses set out above, introduction of
mandatory representation votes for certification has been linked with a
reduction in the number of applications for certification, the proportion
of applications that succeed, and with a reduction in the probability that
an application will result in certification.
Examination of the Ontario Labour Relations Board's (OLRB)
aggregate statistics indicates that, since the introduction of the
mandatory vote procedure to Ontario in November 1995, 4' there has
been a pronounced overall decline in the number of certification
applications filed with the Board.4 2 Table 1 sets out the number of
certification applications filed with the OLRB for each fiscal year from
1993-94 to the latest available data for the 2003-04 year (this
information is also displayed in graph form in Figures 3 and 4). Further,
a study using multivariate regression analysis determined that
introduction of the mandatory vote procedure with Bill 7 in Ontario was
associated with a statistically significant decline in certification
applications of 19.4 per cent, compared to the 1987-90 period.43

4 In Ontario, two episodes of significant change in labour legislation have been the subject
of substantial academic scrutiny. The first period, referred to in this article as the "Bill 40 period,"
spans the period from 1 January 1993 to 9 November 1995, during which a card-check certification
procedure was in place. Bill 40, An Act to Amend CertainActs Concerning Collective Bargaining
and Employment in Ontario,2nd Sess., 35th Leg., 1992, S.O. 1992 c. 21. The second period, the
"Bill 7 period," began 10 November 1995, when Bill 7 came into effect. Bill 7 introduced myriad
changes to the OLRA, including a mandatory representation vote. Bill 7, Labour Relations and
Employment Statute Law Amendment Act, 1st Sess., 36th Leg., Ontario, 1995 (assented to 10
November 1995), S.O. 1995, c. 1.
42 For more detailed discussion of the evidence of a reduction in certification application
activity following introduction of the mandatory certification vote in Ontario see Sara Slinn, "An
Empirical Analysis of the Effects of the Change from Card-Check to Mandatory Vote
Certification" (2004) 11 C.L.E.L.J. 259 [Slinn, "Empirical Analysis"]; Ron Lebi & Elizabeth
Mitchell, "The Decline in Trade Union Certification in Ontario: The Case for Restoring Remedial
Certification" (2003) 10 C.L.E.L.J. 473; and Sara Slinn, "The Effect of Compulsory Certification
Votes on Certification Applications in Ontario: An Empirical Analysis" (2003) 10 C.L.E.L.J. 367
[Slinn, "Compulsory Certification Votes"]. For the effect of similar changes in British Columbia see
C. Riddell, "Union Certification Success under Voting Versus Card-Check Procedures: Evidence
from British Columbia, 1978-1998" (2004), 57 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev 493.
1 Felice Martinello, "Mr. Harris, Mr. Rae, and Union Activity in Ontario" (2000) 26 Can.
Pub. Pol'y 17 at 26.
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Table 1: Ontario Certification Activity
Fiscal Year
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02.
2002-03
2003-04

Applications
Filed
1166
1077
797
683
733
692
700
850
624
658
729

Disposed of

Granted

1135
987
759
656
664
665
567
927
686
627
584

829
762
510
387
424
415
313
521
307
318
301

Granted as proportion of
cases disposed of(%)
73.0
77.2
67.2
59.0
63.9
62.4
55.2
56.2
44.8
50.1
51.5

Source: Ontario, Ontario Labour Relations Board Annual Reports, 1992 to 2001 (Toronto:
Queen's Printer); conversation with Kevin Jenkins, OLRB library for 2001-2004 figures.

Figure 3: Certification Applications Filed and Granted in Ontario
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Figure 4: Certification Success Rate in Ontario
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B.

Different CharacteristicsofApplicant and Successful Units

It was hypothesized above in Part IV that the reduction in
applications and certification activity resulting from introduction of the
mandatory vote would be most evident in relatively difficult to organize
units and among more vulnerable employees, such as workers in the
private sector and in traditionally difficult to organize industries such as
the service industry, part-time workers, and smaller units. Indeed, there
is evidence that statistically significant differences exist between the two
certification regimes in Ontario with respect to the particular
characteristics of applicant units and of certified units. First, there is
evidence that more organizing and certification activity occurred in the
public sector than the private sector under Bill 7 than under Bill 40. The
proportion of all certification applications arising from the public sector
was approximately 8 per cent higher under Bill 7 than it had been under
Bill 40." Further, public sector applicants have a much higher likelihood

I Sara Slinn, "Certification Differences Between Ontario's Public and Private Sectors,
under Card and Vote Systems, 1993 to 1998" in Proceedingsof the 39th Annual Meeting of the
Canadian Industrial Relations Association Held June 25-28, 2002 (Toronto, 2002) 273 at 279
[Slinn, "Certification Differences"].
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of being certified than private sector applicants, and this public sector
advantage is larger under a mandatory vote procedure (15.3 per cent)
than under the card procedure (5.8 per cent).4"
Introduction of the mandatory vote saw a shift in organizing
activity towards industries such as manufacturing, which are a
traditional source of union membership, and away from industries that
are regarded as more difficult to unionize, such as the service sector.
The proportion of both applicants and certified units in the
manufacturing industry was considerably greater during the Bill 7 period
(25 per cent of applications and 24.7 per cent of certifications issued in
this period were for manufacturing units compared to 16.9 per cent of
applicants and 15.7 per cent of successful cases under Bill 40).
Meanwhile certification activity from the service sector was distinctly
lower under Bill 7 than it had been under Bill 40. The proportion of
applicants from this sector was only 67 per cent under Bill 7, while it had
been 76.9 per cent under Bill 40; and, the fraction of successful service
industry cases fell from 77.3 per cent to 66.2 per cent.46
Research also indicates that the influence of the type of
employment in the unit differs between Bill 7 and Bill 40. Under Bill 7
only, there was a significant relationship between units of full-time
employees and the likelihood of certification success. Under this
certification procedure, full-time units enjoyed a 73.1 per cent
probability of certification success, which was 8 per cent greater than for
all-employee units and only 0.8 per cent greater than for part-time
units.47
Further, the mean size of units applied for was significantly
larger under Bill 7 than under Bill 40: 63 employees compared to 40
employees. 48 This difference was even more pronounced among public
sector applications than among applicants from the private sector. The
average number of employees in applicant private sector units was 36
workers under Bill 40, but rose to an average of 49 workers under Bill 7.
Meanwhile, public sector applications under Bill 40 averaged 48
workers, and 89 employees under Bill 7.49
4

Slinn, "Empirical Analysis," supra note 42 at 370.
4Slinn, "Compulsory Certification Votes," supra note 42 at Table 3.
47 Ibid.at 376.
4Slinn, "Certification Experience," supranote 11 at 158, 166.
49
Slinn, "Certification Differences," supra note 44 at Table 3.
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Not surprisingly, then, it has also been found that the average
size of bargaining units granted certification under Bill 7 was
substantially larger, on average (approximately 63 employees),
compared to those units certified under Bill 40 (with a mean of
approximately 36 employees).50 Again, this difference was even more
distinct among public sector cases than among private sector units, with
the average size of public sector units being 43 employees under Bill 40,
and 89 employees under the subsequent legislation. The mean size of
private sector units was 33 workers under Bill 40 and 44 employees
under Bill 7.51
Therefore, as predicted by the model, the evidence
demonstrates that less organizing activity was seen in weaker and more
vulnerable groups of employees such as the private sector, more difficult
to organize industries, among part-time workers, and for smaller units of
employees.
C.

IncreasedUnion Avoidance Activity

The strategic dynamic model of certification predicts that the
level of union avoidance activity employers engage in will be
substantially greater under a mandatory vote procedure than under
card-based certification. However, labour relations boards only collect
data on union avoidance activity if it gives rise to an ULP complaint, and
no surveys of union avoidance activity have yet compared the frequency
of employer anti-union efforts between certification procedures.
Consequently, there is no direct empirical evidence available to test this
hypothesis, and we will only be able to examine data and research on
52

ULPs.

50

Slinn, "Certification Experience," supra note 11 at 158, 166.
' Slinn, "Certification Differences," supra note 44 at Table 4. More precise measurement
of the relationship between unit size and probability of certification has been difficult to achieve,
and regression analysis has suggested that this relationship may be complex and non-linear. Slinn,
"Empirical Analysis," supranote 42 at 374.
52 Considerable research has investigated the effect of employers' union avoidance tactics
on certification outcomes and on the longer-term viability of certified units. Particular tactics have
been found to significantly reduce the likelihood of certification. Karen Bentham, "Employer
Resistance to Union Certification" (2002) 57 R.I. 159; Chris Riddell, "Union Suppression and
Certification Success" (2001) 34 Can. J. Econ. 396; and Terry Thomason & Suzanne Pozzebon,
"Managerial Opposition to Union Certification in Quebec and Ontario" (1998) 53 R.I. 750. Even
the existence of a complaint of employer ULP is associated with a reduced probability of
certification (Riddell, ibid.); Thomason, supra note 19. Further, union avoidance activities by
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The majority of studies do not find that the number or
proportion of ULPS increases with introduction of a mandatory
representation vote; rather, evidence suggests that ULP complaints
decline substantially. Two recent examinations of ULP complaints in
Ontario find that the number of complaints was significantly lower
under the Bill 7 mandatory vote procedure than under the card-check
procedure in place under Bill 40." For instance, Lebi and Mitchell
found that the number of complaints filed in 2001-02 (under mandatory
vote certification) was 30 per cent lower than in 1994-95 (the final year
of card-check certification).54 Further, Martinello found that relatively
more ULP complaints were filed with the OLRB during the Bill 40 period
of card-check certification than in the pre-Bill 40 period (also cardcheck certification). 55
These two studies also suggest that these changes in numbers of
complaints do not necessarily reflect any change in employer behaviour
but instead reflect the union's evaluation of the utility of making a ULP
complaint. The authors note that these results do not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that employers are committing fewer ULPS under the vote
procedure, but may stem from unions' lack of confidence in the Board's
misconduct.5 6
ability to effectively adjudicate or remedy employer
Martinello suggests that this rise in complaints under Bill 40 may reflect
the fact that making such complaints was more attractive to unions
under Bill 40, because this legislation gave the OLRB broader powers to
remedy ULPs. As a result, the increase in complaints during this period
may have been due to unions' greater tendency to file ULP complaints
57
rather than reflecting any change in employers' behaviour. Notably,

employers have been found to make it less likely that a first collective agreement will be reached,
more likely that third party assistance will be necessary in bargaining, and more likely that a
certification will be terminated early (Bentham, ibid.).
s3 Lebi & Mitchell, supra note 42 at 478; Martinello, supra note 43.
4 Lebi & Mitchell, ibid. at 478. Note, however, that it is difficult to test this assertion
because the OLRB's records simply report the number of ULP complaints filed and disposed of, but
do not identify-how many of these cases are related to certification.
I Martinello cautions that, when interpreting this data for the Bill 40 period at least, the
increase in complaints may simply reflect the increase in certification activity during that period.
However, Martinello acknowledges that this does not explain the increase in complaints during the
Bill 7 period, since certification activity fell during that time. Supra note 43 at 29.
56

Lebi & Mitchell, supra note 42 at 478; Martinello, supranote 43 at 29.
Martinello, supra note 43 at 34.

57
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Bill 7 substantially reduced the Board's remedial powers, in particular
by removing its power to order interim reinstatement of terminated
employees, and by making the test for remedial certification more
difficult for unions to meet. Therefore, arguably, Bill 7 made it less
desirable for unions to pursue ULPs and may have led to a reduction in
complaints. Another aspect of board ineffectiveness is delay. Lebi and
Mitchell suggest that the substantial increase in the length of time the
Board takes\ to process complaints that has occurred since Bill 7 was
introduced is another source of lack of confidence in the Board's ability
to usefully address unlawful employer conduct. 8
In contrast with these results, an early study of certification in
British Columbia between 1984 and 1987 found that the ratio of
employer ULP complaints to certification applications averaged 15.9 per
cent over the 1974-83 period of card-check certification, but rose to an
average of 42.7 per cent for the 1984-87 period when representation
votes were required for certification.5 9 The authors concluded that this
reflected a tremendous increase in employer ULPs during organizing
following introduction of the mandatory vote. However, these results
should be read with caution, as the British Columbia Labour Relations
Board does not distinguish, in its collection of aggregate statistics on
ULPs, between those complaints that arise in the context of certification
and those that do not. Therefore, it is not possible to determine how
accurately these ULP statistics reflect the occurrence of complaints
arising from organizing.
In evaluating this evidence against the model's prediction, it is
important to recognize that the number of ULP complaints is not
necessarily related to the incidence of ULPs being committed and is an
even less exact indicator of the level of anti-organizing activity that is
occurring. Therefore, the evidence from the two studies of the Ontario
experience discussed above is not sufficient to reject the hypothesis that
union avoidance activity will increase under a mandatory certification
vote regime.

58

Lebi & Mitchell, supra note 42 at 478.

59

Stan Lanyon & R. Edwards, "The Right to Organize: Labor Law and its Impact in British
Columbia" in Steven Hecker & Margaret Hallock, eds., Labor in a Global Economy. Perspectives
from the 'U.S. and Canada (Labor Education and Research Centre, University of Oregon: U.O.
Books, 1991) 196 at 210.
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D.

Fewer CertificationsGrantedandLower Chance of Success

The OLRB's aggregate statistics also indicate that there has been
a marked overall decline in the number of certifications issued by the
Board in the years since the mandatory vote procedure was introduced
in 1995 (see Table 1 and Figure 3 above). Similarly, it is evident that the
certification success rate (measured as a ratio of the number of
certifications issued to the number of certification applications disposed
of, for each fiscal year) has also declined in the years following Bill 7.
This information is set out in Table 1 and is represented in graph form
in Figure 4, above. A statistically significant difference in overall success
rates in certification applications has been found: with a reduction from
72.7 per cent under Bill 40 to 64.3 per cent under Bill 7.6o
More sophisticated statistical analyses, using multivariate
regression techniques, have concluded that the isolated effect of the
introduction of Bill 7, including the mandatory representation vote, had
a significant negative impact on certification success rates. One study
found that, compared to the 1987-90 period, the number of certification
applications granted was reduced by 28.7 per cent, and the certification
success rate fell by 11.9 per cent.6t Other research estimates that Bill 7
reduced the probability of certification success by approximately 21.5
percentage points, relative to applications filed during the Bill 40
period.62 These findings accord with earlier quantitative empirical
studies involving other Canadian jurisdictions. An examination of the
1984 introduction of mandatory certification elections in British
Columbia concluded that this legislative change resulted in an estimated
10.3 percentage point reduction in certification application success
rates.63 Similarly, a study including certification data aggregated across
nine Canadian jurisdictions, several of which had mandatory vote
requirements, determined that the presence of a vote procedure was
Slinn, "Empirical Analysis," supra note 42 at 359. Studies have also found a statistically

60

significant drop in the certification application success rate between the Bill 40 and Bill 7 periods
within each of the private and public sectors, with the decline in the private sector being
substantially greater than that in the public sector. Slinn, "Certification Differences," supra note 44
at 280; Slinn, "Compulsory Certification Votes," supra note 42.
61Martinello, supra note 43 at 24; Slinn, "Certification Experience," supra note 11.
62

Slinn, "Empirical Analysis," supra note 42 at 368.

Felice Martinello, "Correlates of Certification Application Success in British Columbia,
Saskatchewan and Manitoba" (1996) 51 R.I. 544.
63
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associated with approximately a 9 per cent reduction in the certification
success rate in that jurisdiction.'
These observations and empirical results support the hypotheses
that certification rates and likelihood of certification success would be
reduced under the mandatory vote procedure.
VI.

PROPOSED
LABOUR
AMENDMENTS

RELATIONS

SYSTEM

Accepting that we are unlikely to see a widespread return to the
card-check procedure, due to the political cost of such a change,65 the
more pressing question becomes: Can we lessen the undesirable
consequences of the existing mandatory vote procedure? The strategic
dynamic certification model identifies the most important undesirable
outcomes of the vote procedure, and the elements of the procedure
producing these negative outcomes: the encouragement of unlawful
employer conduct and the deterrence of employee participation in the
unionization decision. Thus, this model allows us to focus our reforms
on these elements. Therefore, procedural revisions must concentrate on
these two aspects of the certification process, with the following goals in
mind: first, decreasing incentives and increasing disincentives for
employers to engage in unlawful union-avoidance activities; and second,
reducing the costs and risks that deter employees from engaging in the
unionization decision. Recommendations addressing these two elements
will improve the accuracy and legitimacy of this certification procedure
by allowing it to better gauge employees' wishes regarding union
representation.
These objectives would be furthered by introducing changes
such as providing greater confidentiality to employees; introducing a

Susan Johnson, "Card Check or Mandatory Vote? How the Type of Union Recognition
Procedure Affects Union Certification Success" (2002) Econ. J. 344.
65 In Ontario, for instance, the recently-elected Liberal government has not proposed
reversing the previous Conservative government's changes to labour legislation by re-instituting
card-check certification for any industry other than construction (Bill 144, supra note 9 at s. 8).
Although return to the card-check system is proposed for only a single industry, Bill 144 met great
resistance from the opposition, employers, and employers' groups. A private member's bill
proposed by a New Democratic Party Member of the Legislature, Bill 151, Labour Relations
Amendment Act (Certification), proposed re-introducing card-check certification for all other
industries covered by the OLRA. This Bill did not progress beyond First Reading, on 25 November
2004.
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quicker vote; and providing timely and effective processing and
remedies for ULPs, which would be facilitated by developing and
applying more readily used bright-line rules for distinguishing unlawful
conduct. More certain communication of these rules to both employers
and employees would also be helpful. A final focus for change is to
remove or reverse accompanying legislative amendments that
exacerbate the undesirable effects of the mandatory vote procedure.
A.

Confidential Voting

Representation elections, as they are presently run, provide
employers (and unions) with a great deal of information about which
employees voted and about the ballots cast.66 Elections take place at the
workplace, with employer and union scrutineers present and able to
observe which employees vote. Later, the board releases detailed
information about the ballots cast. This level of worker scrutiny is
unnecessary, and encourages employers and unions to draw conclusions
about, and possibly punish, individual employees' choices. Employees
should have the opportunity to freely choose both whether and how to
vote.
There are several options for providing employees with greater
privacy in elections. These include using alternative voting mechanisms
or replacing elections with board-conducted employee polls, and
limiting the amount of election information released by the board..
These alternatives offer several benefits. Allowing voting outside of the
workplace through mail-in or electronic voting, or conducting board
polls rather than elections, would relieve employees' fears of employer
and union scrutiny over their voting choices. Additionally, mail-in or
electronic voting may remove employer resentment at having board
officers invade their property and set up polling stations, which may
taint the bargaining relationship as an early demonstration to the
employer of the board (and the union's) ability to seize control of the
employer's own workplace. These alternatives could also reduce
expenses the board incurs in setting up and staffing certification polls at
different worksites.
Employees could be relieved of scrutiny and allowed a truly
"secret" ballot by introducing an alternative vote mechanism, such as
Representation elections under the OLRA are used as an example here.
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mailed-in ballots or electronic voting. Mailed-in ballots are currently
used in circumstances such as remote worksites where some employees,
though eligible to vote, are not reasonably able to attend at the
workplace to cast their votes. This could be provided as an option
available to all eligible voters, although it is a slow and cumbersome
process. "Regional poll site" internet voting, "kiosk" internet voting, or
remote online voting are three forms of electronic voting that could be
useful in certification elections.67 The main weakness of regional poll
site or kiosk electronic voting is that the polling locations-although any
provincial government facility, or public facilities such as libraries could
be used--may not be conveniently accessible to all employees. Another
possible difficulty arises where individuals not on the voters' list seek to
cast ballots. Current board practice is to double-seal these ballots and to
determine whether or not to count them after a hearing has been held
on the issue. This may be difficult to accommodate with unstaffed kiosks
or online voting.
Electronic voting is still in its infancy and gives rise to a number
of concerns such as difficulty with remote voter authentication; technical
problems, including deliberate interference with the service, causing
voters to be unable to access online voting; concerns about whether
ballot secrecy can. be ensured if votes are cast by employees on their
employer's computer or if the computer is infected by a virus; the
potential for alteration or loss of ballots; reliability of vote transport and
storage to ensure no votes are lost or altered; and preventing individuals
from casting multiple votes.68 However, these limitations should be
assessed in view of the fact that these methods may be used as an
alternative, rather than the sole, means of voting, and that
representation elections are of a much smaller, more manageable scale
than political elections. Even at this early stage of technological
development, online voting has been used in a number of political and

67 "Regional Poll Site" or "kiosk" voting systems provide computers at staffed and
unstaffed polling places, respectively. "Remote" online voting allows voters to cast their vote from
any internet-connected computer (and possibly digital television and mobile phone), at either a
public or private terminal. For a comprehensive overview of online voting systems see
Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, "Online Voting" Number 155 (May 2001) 2,
online: U.K. Parliament <http://www.parliament.uk/post/pn155.pdf>.

' California, Report of the California Internet Voting Task Force (January 2000), online:
California Secretary of State <http://www.ss.ca.gov/executive/ivote/>. This report's concerns about
internet voting are summarized in Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, ibid.at 4.
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private elections.6 9 Although a union representation election has not yet
been held electronically, this may not be far off.7"
Another option is to replace elections with board-conducted
polls of employees. Without employer or union scrutiny, board officers
would confidentially poll each employee regarding which of three
alternatives the employee preferred: certification for the applicant
union; status quo (no certification for the union); or whether the
employee has no preference between the first two options. There are
several benefits of this alternative: it is secret, and unlike the vote
procedure it is truly confidential-the number and identity of
participants is not information that an employer (or union) could use
against employees; the board officer could answer any questions the
employee might have about the choices before them or the effect of
their selection; employees do not have to decide whether to vote or not;
there is no employer or union scrutiny; and it is a census of employee
wishes, removing any uncertainty about the wishes of employees who
would have chosen not to cast a ballot in an election. The main barrier
to implementing such polls would be the amount of board time and
resources that would be required, although some costs could be
recovered if the board charged unions and employers fees for this
service.
Apart from the lack of confidentiality employees endure at the
voting booth, labour .boards disclose detailed information about
elections, including the total number of ballots cast, the number of votes

69 Online voting services have been provided for both political and union elections by a
company called Election.com. In 2001 Accenture purchased the public sector assets of this
company, and continues to provide these "eDemocracy Services." Accenture Press Releases,
online: <http://www.accenture.com/xd/xd.asp?it = enweb&xd =_dyn\dynamicpressrelease_624.xml;
For
http://www.accenture.com/xd/xd.asp?it= enweb&xd =_dyn\dynamicpressrelease_189.xml>.
examples of electronic political and union elections, see Parliamentary Office of Science and
Technology, supra note 67.

7 The Trades Union Congress (TUC) coordinated an "e-Democracy" e-mail campaign,
held 20 January 2003, that succeeded in urging the British Minister for Employment Relations to
amend the Employment Relations Act 1999 to allow unions to conduct statutory elections
electronically. Trades Union Congress, online: <http://www.tuc.org.uk/thetuc/votesupport.cfm>.
Although not an election, the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) offered union
authorization cards on its website for employees to sign and mail in during its 1999 campaign to
organize a Las Vegas Wal-mart. UFCW, online: <http://www.walmartworkerslv.com/organize/
sign.htm>.
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for and against the union, and the number of spoiled ballots.71 Especially
in close elections or smaller workplaces, this information may tempt an
employer to speculate about the voting of individual workers, and
employees may be concerned that they will be punished for voting---or
perhaps for not voting.
Rather than releasing this detailed information, boards could
simply disclose the proportion of eligible votes cast in favour of
certification. This would better protect employees from employer
retaliation by making it more difficult for the employer to discern how
individuals voted. Employers may argue that this will reduce their
confidence in election outcomes. Without knowing how many
employees voted, the employer may believe that the election was not
truly representative of the wishes of its employees. However, the
legislatures in most jurisdictions have decided not to require that any
minimum proportion of employees in the unit cast ballots in order for
an election to be valid. For those jurisdictions requiring a minimum
fraction of voters, as long as this minimum is met, then the legislature
has effectively determined that no further requirement of
representativeness is necessary.
B.

ProtectEmployees Duringthe Post-ApplicationStage

A key attribute of the card-check procedure is that employee
support for unionization is measured, in many cases, before the
employer is aware of organizing and, therefore, before the employer has
a chance to unlawfully interfere with employees' free choice. In contrast,
under the vote procedure, elections are held several days after the
employer receives notice of the application. During this post-application
stage employer interference is most likely and employees are at their
most vulnerable. The risks to employees during this period could be
reduced by accelerating the vote, or by increasing supervision of the
workplace. Each alternative would reduce the opportunity for unlawful
employer interference.
Possible drawbacks to shortening the pre-election period by
introducing an even sooner "quick vote" are that it may be difficult for
the board to hold elections quickly, and that employers will still be
71 See e.g. Ontario, Ministry of Labour, OLRB Monthly Reports (Toronto: Queen's

Printer).
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aware of the certification application prior to the election and may still
be able to engage in unlawful conduct. Indeed, an abbreviated preelection period may result in employer responses that are -even less
considered and more reactionary than is currently the situation.
Alternatively, increasing supervision of the workplace during the
post-application period by permitting a union representative or a board
representative to attend at the workplace to monitor for ULPs might
discourage at least the most blatant forms of employer misconduct
during this period. However, employers would likely object strongly to
being required to allow a union or board presence in their workplace.
C.

Expedited ULP Processing

Access to prompt processing of complaints of ULPs alleged to
have been committed during organizing is vital to ensuring the integrity
of representation elections and discouraging ULPS. For example, British
Columbia's Code requires the board to hold an expedited hearing for
any ULP complaint alleging unlawful discharge, suspension, transfer, layoff, or other discipline-whether or not it is in the context of
organizing--as long as no collective agreement is in force. The board
must commence the hearing within three days of the date the complaint
is filed, is directed to proceed promptly with the hearing, and is required
to issue a decision on the complaint within two days of the end of the
hearing.72 Similar provisions should be incorporated into the legislation
of all mandatory vote jurisdictions.73

D.

Effective ULP Remedies

Hand in hand with expedited hearing of ULP complaints goes the
need for timely and effective remedies capable of restoring the harm
done by unlawful employer conduct and of discouraging employer
misconduct. These are daunting requirements for a board to meet. In
the certification context this requires that remedies be available prior to
the election and that the board have the power to order the most'
British Columbia Labour Relations Code, supra note 10, s. 5(2).
z Note that until 1995, Ontario had a provision for expedited hearings of ULP complaints.
In 1995, Bill 7 removed the provision that had been introduced in 1993 by Bill 40 requiring the
OLRB to hold an expedited hearing if one was requested (usually by the union, of course) on a ULP
complaint of discharge or discipline during organizing. Supra note 41, s. 92(2).
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effective remedies. The key challenge is to do so within the short time
frame of the "quick vote": generally five to ten days from the date of
application. While the "quick vote" element of the mandatory vote
procedure was intended to prevent American-style campaigns and to
allow elections to take place before significant employer interference
can take place, the brief period between the certification application
and election is also one of the greatest obstacles to effectively
prosecuting and remedying ULPs.
Interim remedies and availability of expedited hearing of ULP
complaints would make it possible for remedies to have the intended
effect of reversing the effect of unlawful employer interference on
employees when it still matters: prior to the election. Further, remedies
such as remedial certification must be made available to be ordered by
boards. Lebi and Mitchell argue convincingly that remedial certification
is the single most effective deterrent and effective remedy for ULPs
during organizing.74
Bright-line Standardsfor ULPs

E.

Whether or not particular conduct constitutes a ULP depends
very much on the particular facts of the case, making it difficult for
employers, unions, and employees alike to predict whether a given
action will be determined to be unlawful. This uncertainty may
encourage employers to engage in borderline conduct and may
discourage unions and workers from pursuing complaints. Development
of clearer rules and principles for ULPS would ameliorate this situation,
although it would be a difficult challenge for boards to develop their
jurisprudence in this manner.
Additionally, it would be helpful to have standards of conduct
communicated to employers early in the certification process to ensure
that employers were aware of at least those activities that are already
clearly proscribed during organizing. This is particularly important for
employers with little or no labour relations experience. Some labour
boards already require the applicant union to provide the employer with
copies of board certification information bulletins with the certification
application the union must deliver to the employer. Information
74

Lebi & Mitchell, supranote 42.
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bulletins on ULPs could also be included in this package of certification
documents. Alternatively, employers may be more receptive to this
guidance if it was received from the board rather than from the union,
and these materials could be sent to employers by the board at the time
it sends them confirmation of the application for certification.
F.

AncillaryAmendments

A mandatory vote procedure was often introduced as one
element of a package of amendments to provincial labour legislation.
Although in none of these instances were ancillary changes included in
the package with the intention of counteracting any anticipated negative
effects of imposing a vote requirement for certification, in some cases
accompanying amendments exacerbated the situation by enhancing the
distortions in the system introduced by the change in representation
procedure. These ancillary changes included: expanding the scope of
employer anti-union conduct; restricting remedies for employer ULPs;
and removing the requirement that allegations of ULPs during
organizing, such as unlawful termination or discipline, be heard on an
expedited basis.75

For instance, at the same time mandatory votes were introduced in Ontario in 1995, the
requirement that the OLRB comply with a party's request for an expedited hearing on a ULP
complaint of discharge or discipline during organizing (s. 92.2 OLRA) was removed, the Board's
jurisdiction to order interim reinstatement of terminated employees was removed, and the Board's
power to order remedial certification for employer unfair labour practices was restricted, and
shortly thereafter removed altogether. Labour Relations and Employment Statute Law
Amendment Act, supra note 8, ss. 97(2), 11(1). Remedial certifications were later removed
altogether from the Labour Relations Act by the Economic Development and Workplace
DemocracyAct, 1998, S.O. 1998, c. 8 (in force 29 June 1998), but were just recently reinstated by s.
2 of Bill 144 (in force 13 June 2005).
In British Columbia, soon after mandatory votes were reinstituted in August 2001 with the
Skills Development and Labour Statutes Amendment Act, supra note 8, additional amendments
were made to the B.C. Labour Relations Code, including changes to unfair labour practice
provisions and the provision setting out employers' right to communicate with employees.
Amendments to sections 2, 6(1), and 8 of the Labour Relations Code; R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 244,
pursuant to ss. 3 and 4 of the Labour Relations Code Amendment Act, 2002, S.B.C. 2002 c. 47 (in
force 1 September 2002) (B.C. Reg. 182/2002). The effect of these changes was to substantially
broaden the scope for employer communications, such that previously unlawful conduct, including
during union organizing, would now be lawful. Convergys Customer Management Canada Inc.,
BCLRB Letter Decision No. B62/2003 at paras. 102-04, online: <http://www.lrb.bc.ca/decisions/
B62$2003.pdf>, upheld on reconsideration, BCLRB Letter Decision No. B111/2003, online:
<http://www.lrb.bc.ca/decisions/Bl 1l$2003.pdf>.
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Clearly, these types of ancillary legislative changes aggravate the
weaknesses of the vote procedure by further encouraging employer
misconduct during organizing. Therefore, these changes should be
reversed: labour boards should have broad remedial powers and,
particularly in the circumstances of a "quick vote," boards should be
empowered to hold expedited hearings into complaints of ULPS
committed during organizing.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The strategic dynamic model of certification, illustrating
the
interdependence and interconnection between the elements of the
certification process, is an effective framework for analyzing the
certification process, and explaining the conduct of actors and the
outcomes of unionization attempts. Application of the model
demonstrates that an alteration to the legislative framework, such as
changing the certification procedure, cannot be made in isolation and
without affecting the operation of the labour relations system more
broadly. Such a change alters the incentives, disincentives, and
opportunities for the participants in the system. In particular, the
change from a card-check to a mandatory representation vote
certification procedure increases the opportunities and incentives for
employers to engage in unlawful union avoidance activities, reduces the
incentives for unions to organize new members, and discourages
employees from participating in the unionization decision.
Finally, this article offers several improvements, using the model
to guide reform of the legislative framework. These proposals include
measures that would increase confidentiality for employees voting,
better protect employees from employer retaliation during the postapplication stage, expedite processing of ULP complaints, offer more
effective remedies for ULPs, and provide clearer standards defining
unlawful conduct. These proposed changes have the potential to reduce
the negative effects of the mandatory vote certification procedure,
thereby enhancing the validity of the certification process and the labour
relations system.

